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Influence Maximization in Noncooperative Social 
Networks 
Yi1e Yang, Victor O.K. Li, Kuang Xu 
University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, China 
Abstract-In this paper, we consider the problem of maxi­
mizing information propagation with noncooperative nodes in 
social networks. We generalize the linear threshold model to 
take node noncooperation into consideration and provide a prov­
able approximation guarantees for the noncooperative inßuence 
maximization problem. We propose an analytical model based 
on the generalized maximum ßow problem to characterize the 
noncooperative behavior of an individual node in maximizing 
inßuence. Based on this, we develop a new seed node selection 
strategy, under the linear threshold model, to account for user 
noncooperativeness. Extensive simulations on large collaboration 
networks show that our proposed ßow-based strategy outper­
forms the weighted degree scheme under various noncooperative 
scenarios. The evaluation also validates the importance of coop­
eration and incentives in maximizing inßuence. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In online advertising campaigns, identifying pilot customers 
is important in order to maximize the advertisement influence 
among the whole target audience. The prevalence of online 
social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter [1] 
offers the possibility of mining for necessary information. 
Normally, initially activated seed nodes are more cooperative 
to forward the product information because being selected 
as early adopters makes them feel "special". Also, incentives 
offered by companies may foster initial users' sense of duty 
to recommend the products to their neighbors in the social 
network [2]. However, other ordinary (i.e. non-seed) users may 
not pass along the information because of the costs of re­
sources (time, personal information, etc.) and lack of incentive. 
Existing work focuses on the formulation of related influence 
propagation models [3] and optimization problems [4] [5], as 
well as on seed node selection algorithms which can achieve 
the near-optimal performance [6], but they do not study the 
heterogeneity of cooperativeness between the seed and the 
ordinary nodes in the influence propagation process. 
In this work, firstly, we generalize the standard linear thresh­
old model (LTM) to take node noncooperation into considera­
tion, and provide a provable approximation guarantees for the 
corresponding model. In a noncooperative influence diffusion 
model we define a node in the system to be noncooperative 
if it chooses to reserve some of its resources during the 
influence propagation process. Specifically, in noncooperative 
LTM it means that a noncooperative active node will not use 
its link's fuH capacity, which is the weight of edges in the 
social graph to influence its inactive neighbors. Secondly, we 
propose an analytical model, based on the generalized maxi­
mum flow problem, that characterizes the behavior of nodes in 
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influence maximization problem. Drawing on maximum flow, 
we are able to determine the maximal amount of influence 
between pairs of nodes on the basis of all independent paths 
in the graph. We believe this more accurately depicts the 
influence propagation process in social networks. In addition, 
we propose a new seed node selection strategy for LTM to 
account for node noncooperativeness, under the example of 
the recently proposed cluster-based heuristic strategy [7]. We 
also conducted extensive simulations on large collaboration 
networks, and the result not only shows that node cooperation 
as weH as incentives play fundamental roles in determining 
performance of influence maximization algorithms, but also 
proves that our proposed strategy is more robust when nodes 
are not cooperative. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as foHows. Related 
work is described in Section 11. We present the problem 
formulation and diffusion model in Section III. In Section IV 
we describe the generalized noncooperative LTM and provide 
some nice properties of the model, followed by the description 
of the noncooperative influence maximization problem and 
the proposed flow-based centrality measure. The evaluation is 
presented in Section V. Finally, we conclude this study with 
suggestions for future work in Section VI. 
11. RELATED WORK 
Network flow problems [8], especially the maximum flow 
problem, have been important problems in networking re­
search. They have recently found applications in online rep­
utation systems [9] and P2P incentive paradigm design [10]. 
In [11], the authors introduce a modified betweenness-based 
centrality measure which is based on the concept of network 
flows. While the traditional betweenness 1 metric measures the 
centrality of a specific node Xi as the proportion of shortest 
paths that contain Xi, the flow-based centrality calculates the 
proportion of the flow that passes through Xi. The advantage 
of the new measure is two-fold. Firstly, the flow-based metric 
can be applied to a wider variety of network datasets, for it is 
defined for both binary and non-binary graphs. Secondly, the 
new metric considers all the independent paths between all 
pairs of nodes in the network, instead of merely the shortest 
paths, which is more realistic in some application scenarios. 
In the Linear Threshold Model of influence maximization, 
weights on the edges reflect the influence magnitude between 
1 The betweenness of a node is the fraction of shortest paths between all 
possible pairs of nodes that pass through this node [12]. 
nodes, and the influence propagates through all the possible 
paths, which makes the flow-based centrality a promising al­
ternative. However, the flow-based metric proposed prec1udes 
the possibility that nodes in the system may not be willing to 
forward the influence received. In this paper we generalize 
the original maximum flow problem to account for node 
noncooperativeness. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
is the first to discuss the possibility of utilizing network flow 
theory to model node noncooperation in networks. 
In the field of communication and computer networks, 
[13], [14] and [15] respectively studied the problem of nonco­
operative routing, load balancing, and flow control as examples 
of the impact of noncooperation on the overall performance 
of networked systems. While previous work focused on the 
inefficiency caused by node noncooperation in traditional 
transportation and communication networks, here we address 
this question in the online social advertising scenario. In this 
paper we mainly focus on the final influence size when the 
system reaches steady state. Therefore we assume a two­
tiered and static differentiation of node cooperativeness in 
the system, i.e. seed nodes are cooperative to propagate the 
influence while the ordinary nodes are only partly willing to 
do so, and node cooperativeness will stay constant over time. 
We will leave the transient distribution of node cooperativeness 
(e.g., cooperativeness is related to incentives, social distance, 
and changes over time) for future investigation. 
Issues of extracting influence diffusion model parameters 
from real network datasets are beyond the scope of the paper. 
Readers interested are suggested to refer to some machine 
leaming papers, e.g. [16], [17], [18], and [19]. 
III. MODEL 
In this section, we formulate the influence maximization 
problem and describe the two mainstream diffusion models. 
A. Problem formulation 
We consider an online social network (OSN) as a directed 
graph g(V, E), where V is the set of nodes (OSN users) and 
E � V x V is the set of edges (social ties) in the network. 
We also denote by Nu � V the set of neighbors of node u. 
Each node in the system can either be active or inactive. As 
more neighbors of an inactive node become active, the more 
likely it will switch to active. A node cannot return to the 
inactive state once it becomes active. All nodes are inactive 
at the beginning of the influence propagation process and 
marketing practitioners try to initially activate K nodes to seed 
the information cascade in the social network. The process 
ends when no more nodes can be activated. The influence 
maximization problem is defined as follows: Determine the 
K-node set to achieve the maximal expected active nodes at 
the end of the process. 
B. Diffusion models 
In the literature there are mainly two diffusion models 
utilized to mimic the propagation effect, namely, the Linear 
Threshold Model (LTM) [20] and the Independent Cascade 
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Model (ICM) [21]. In LTM, a node i has a weight of influence 
bi,j on node j. Node j is pre-assigned a uniformly distributed 
threshold Oj E [0,1]. At each discrete time step, node j is 
considered activated when the sum of weights from its active 
neighbors exceeds the threshold Oj . In ICM, a node i activated 
at time t has a probability Pi,j to successfully activate its 
inactive neighbor j at time t + 1. N ode i does not have any 
further opportunities to activate j again whether it succeeds or 
not. In this paper we mainly focus on the study of LTM and 
defer the ICM case as future work. 
IV. NONCOOPERATIVE INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION 
PROBLEM 
We study the inefficiency of influence maximization in 
terms of the final influence size because of node noncoopera­
tion in this section. We first introduce a noncooperative linear 
threshold model, and then provide some useful properties of 
the model. After that we describe an analytical model based 
on the generalized maximum flow problem which accounts for 
node noncooperativeness, and then we propose a maximum­
flow-based centrality measure and illustrate it under the exam­
pIe of the newly proposed c1uster-based seed node selection 
heuristic [7]. 
A. A noncooperative linear threshold model 
An implicit assumption under LTM is that nodes in the 
system are all cooperative to propagate the influence, which 
we think may be unrealistic as discussed in Section I. In 
general, each node can have distinct cooperativeness levels 
compared to other nodes. For the ease of simulation and 
without loss of generality here we assume a two-tiered and 
static differentiation of node cooperativeness in the system, 
i.e. seed nodes are cooperative to propagate the influence while 
the ordinary nodes are only partly willing to do so. We further 
define Node i to be a-cooperative so that weights of edges 
coming out of Node i are multiplied by a factor a E [0,1]. 
Formally, under the generalized noncooperative LTM, the 
activation criteria for N ode j becomes 
0< J -
i active neighbor of j 
where ai,j E [0,1] measures the cooperativeness of Node 
i on its neighbor Node j. Under the two-tiered and static 
differentiation of node cooperativeness, we can set ai,j = 1 
if Node i belongs to the seed-node set because they are 
cooperative to contribute all their influence capacity that can 
be imposed on their neighbors and ai,j = a < 1 otherwise, 
that is all non-seed nodes are considered a-cooperative, which 
means that they will reserve some of their channel capacities 
due to various reasons. 
B. Properties of the model 
We now discuss some nice properties of the noncooperative 
LTM. First we define a set function 0"(') to be submodular if 
0"(8U {v}) - 0"(8) � O"(TU {v}) -u(T) for all v E V \ T and 
8 � T, i.e., 0"(') satisfies a "diminishing returns" requirement: 
the marginal gain from adding a node to a set T is at most 
the same as the marginal gain from adding the same node to 
a subset of T. In addition, we say that u(·) is monotone if 
u(T) :s:: u(S) for all S � T, that is, u(·) will at least stay 
the same after adding elements to the original set. We also 
define a greedy algorithm as follows: starting from an empty 
set, the algorithm iteratively selects a seed which achieves 
the highest incremental change of u( · ) . [22] provides a result 
that a non-negative, monotone submodular objective function 
can be approximated to within a factor of (1 - l/e) (around 
63%, here e is the base of the natural logarithm) using greedy 
algorithm, which is as follows: 
Theorem 1. [22] The greedy algorithm is a (l-l/e) approx­
imation for a non-negative, monotone submodular objective 
function. 
[6] further proves that the greedy algorithm can also achieve 
(l- l/e) approximation for the influence maximization prob­
lem by proving that the final influence function u (. ) , which is 
the expected number of the final active node in the network at 
the end of the diffusion process, is submodular. Based on [6], 
we prove that under the two-tiered and static differentiation 
of node cooperativeness, the influence function under the 
proposed noncooperative LTM also satisfies the requirement 
of submodularity, so that a greedy algorithm can also achieve 
the same (1 - 1/ e) performance guarantee. 
Lemma 1. [6] The infiuence function u ( .) is submodular for 
an arbitrary instance of the LTM. 
Theorem 2. Under the two-tiered and static differentiation of 
node cooperativeness, the infiuence function u(·) of noncoop­
erative LTM is submodular. 
Proof" Since the cooperativeness parameter ai,j can be 
considered constant (a or 1) under the two-tiered and static 
cooperativeness differentiation, the noncooperative LTM is 
equivalent to a standard LTM in which b�,j = ai,jbi,j . Thus 
according to Lemma 1, the influence function of noncoopera­
tive LTM is also submodular. • 
Proving that the influence function under noncooperative 
LTM also satisfies the requirement of submodularity not only 
shows that the model has a performance guarantee, but also 
implies that the incentive needed for the advertising campaign 
should show similar property, since the amount of incentive 
needed is closely related to the initial active set size. It is 
also intuitively satisfying that incentive as a function of initial 
active users would show a "diminishing returns" property. 
The detailed study of the relationship between the amount of 
incentive and seed-node set size in noncooperative influence 
maximization problem will be our future work. 
Note that we have to use Monte-Carlo simulations to esti­
mate u(·) because there is no explicit formula for the influence 
function. This means that we can obtain a (1 - 1/ e - E) 
approximation with small E if we run a large number of 
simulations. 
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Fig. 1. Maximum flow from Node A to Node C 
C. The framework 
In LTM, it is natural to consider edges of the graph as 
charmeis of influence propagation between pairs of people, and 
the weight of each edge as the capacity of the channel linking 
them. The capacity is the maximum amount of information 
that can be transmitted between them. It is reasonable to 
assurne that a pair of people in the social network who are 
socially close are connected by a channel with large capacity 
while pairs less close are assigned "narrower" channels, i.e., 
with lower capacity. 
In influence maximization problems, the key is to measure 
the influence Node A can impose on Node B quantitatively. 
The characteristics of online social advertising, such as random 
communication and influence intentionany channeled through 
multiple intermediaries renders information, or influence flow 
to take more than one route. Thus a reasonable metric is the 
overall information flow along an possible paths that connect 
them, for it reflects the total amount of influence that can 
be transmitted between two nodes. In other words, the flow 
between two nodes not only depends on the capacity of the 
direct charmei, but also on the capacities of an charmeis on 
an the indirect paths that connect the two. For example, to 
measure the total influence Node A can impose on Node C in 
Figure 1, it is incomplete to only count the direct link between 
A and C. The path passing Node B as intermediary should 
also be considered. 
Ford and Fulkerson [23] formulated a problem to ca1culate 
tbis kind of network flow, namely, the maximum flow problem. 
The problem defines a flow from a source to a sink constrained 
by two conditions: (1) the flow value cannot exceed the 
charmel capacity, (2) the flow into any intermediate node must 
be equal to the flow out of that node. Under this formulation, 
in Figure 1, the maximum flow between Nodes A and C would 
be l(A --t C) + 3(A --t B --t C) = 4, which is the maximal 
possible amount of flow that can be transmitted from Node A 
to Node C. 
However, the second constraint, which is often referred to as 
conservation of fiows implicitly assurnes that an intermediate 
node will automatically forward all information it receives 
from its neighbors. That is an nodes in the network are 
assumed to be cooperative, wbich is unreasonable as discussed 
in Section I. So we generalize the traditional maximum 
Fig. 2. Clustering with w = 0.4, w is the cut-off threshold utilized in cluster 
identification scheme as described in [7] 
fiow problem by introducing a single variable representing 
node noncooperativeness. The mathematical formulation of the 
generalized maximum fiow problem is as follows: 
Let s, t E V be the source and sink of the network g. The 
capacity of an edge is a mapping c : E -t � +, denoted by 
Cuv. It represents the maximum amount of fiow that can pass 
through an edge. A fiow is a mapping I : E -t �+, denoted 
by luv, subject to the following two constraints: 
1) luv:::; Cuv, for each (u,v) E E. 
2) 
L luv - L Ivu = bv, (1) 
u :(u ,v)Ee u :(v,u )Ee 
for each v E V \ {s, t}. bv � 0 is the difference between 
the sum of fiow coming in and out of Node v. This 
is the amount of fiow Node v chooses to reserve, so it 
naturally measures the noncooperativeness of Node v, i.e. 
the bigger bv is, the more noncooperative Node v iso Note 
that bv = 0 means that N ode v is willing to forward all 
its incorning infiuence, and the corresponding problem 
becomes the traditional maximum fiow problem. 
The objective of the proposed generalized maximum fiow 
problem is to maxirnize I/sl 
= 
Lv:(v,t)Et: Ivt. I/sl will be 
utilized to ca1culate the centrality metric in the following seed 
node selection heuristic. 
D. Maximum-fiow-based centrality measure 
We first give a brief description of the fiow-based centrality 
value proposed in Section IV-C under the example of the 
clustering scheme proposed in [7]. A detailed discussion of 
the theoretical rationale behind the cluster-based scheme and 
parameter choosing can be found in [7]. 
In social networks, nodes considered infiuential (i.e. with 
high betweenness value) tend to form tightly-knit regions, 
which is known as homophily [24]. Thus in traditional 
betweenness-based scheme, selecting seed nodes merely ac­
cording to their betweeness value will inevitably cause over­
lapping activations, which is wasteful as multiple initial nodes 
are expended to cover a small region. The cluster-based 
heuristic can avoid this problem by deliberately diversifying 
seed nodes into different regions (i.e. clusters) of the network 
instead of only searching intensively in a small area. This 
2837 
motivates us to illustrate the maximum-fiow-based centrality 
measure under the example of the cluster-based algorithm. 
Also calculating this centrality measure in clusters instead of 
the whole graph can largely reduce the computational cost. 
Studying the impact of other clustering strategies (e.g. [25]) 
on our selection scheme will be our future work. 
To select the target node, we need to find the most infiuential 
node in order to maxirnize the number of activated nodes. [7] 
defined a weighted degree metric which is the sum of weights 
from a node to all its neighbors. It is obvious that the proposed 
metric confines a node's infiuence only in its own social circle 
while it is more reasonable to measure a node's importance 
in terms of its overall infiuence in its own cluster, or even in 
the whole graph. Moreover, considering the infiuence in only 
one hop makes it impossible to take node noncooperativeness 
into consideration. For example, selecting a seed node merely 
according to its weighted degree value would possibly result 
in choosing an "infiuential" node with highly noncooperative 
neighbors, then the infiuence will be confined in its own social 
circle and the performance would be unsatisfactory. In this 
case it may be better to choose a less "infiuential" node but 
with more cooperative neighbors, who are willing to further 
propagate the infiuence they receive. 
We define an alternative fiow-based centrality metric ri 
which is the sum of maximum fiow values from Node i to 
Node j, where j is a node in the same cluster, and the fiow 
values are calculated one after another. The cluster head is 
the node with biggest ri. For example, in Figure 2 we will 
select Node A as the cluster head of the corresponding cluster 
because rA = I(A -t D) + 0.5(A -t M) + 0.5(A -t N) = 2 
(suppose all nodes in the network are cooperative, i.e. bv = 0 
in (1), for each v E V), which is the highest in its cluster. 
N odes B and C will be selected as cluster heads under sirnilar 
ca1culations. 
Finally, a formal statement of the fiow-based seed-node 
selection method under the example of cluster-based heuristic 
is given in Algorithm 1. 
V. EVALUATION 
In this section, we study the effect of node noncooperation 
on the system performance in terms of the final active set 
size. We test our proposed algorithm on real large acadernic 
collaboration networks. 
A. Dataset and infiuence model 
We evaluated our proposed heuristic on Arxiv's co­
authorship network under the General Re1ativity and Quantum 
Cosmology category [26]. The graph constructed contains 
4158 nodes and 26850 edges. Each node is an author, and an 
edge between two authors i and j means that they have co­
authored a paper. We consider the co-authoring relationships 
between two authors only once in case that two authors have 
co-written more than one paper. 
To deterrnine the weights of edges in LTM, we further define 
that if Node i with degree di connects to Node j, edge (j, i) 
has weight i. An intuitive explanation for this assignment 
Algorithm 1 Cluster-based heuristic 
Let e1, ... , eN be nodes and Cl, ... , CM be clusters 
Input: 
Network Q(V,E) with weight bi,j for (i,j) � E. 
A given integer K and a pre-determined threshold w; 
Output: 
The final target set St; 
1: St +--- 0 
2: if (i,j) � E and bi,j < w then 
3: delete (i,j) from E. 
4: end if 
5: Use DFS to identify M clusters from Q . 
6: if M < K then 
7: 
8: 
set a larger w. 
GOTO 1. 
9: end if 
10: Choose the K largest clusters { Cl, ... , C K } . 
11: for i = 1 to K do 
12: find node e with the largest value of I in Ci. 
13: St +--- St U{ e } 
14: end for 
is that the more friends a node has, the less likely it will be 
infiuenced by a single friend. 
B. Cooperativeness differentiation 
In order to differentiate node cooperativeness level in the 
simulation under noncooperative LTM, for the fiow-based 
centrality value calculation, we can take nodes' noncooper­
ativeness into consideration by assuming that intermediate 
ordinary nodes will reserve 1 - 0: of its incoming fiow, i.e. 
they will only forward 0: of the fiow it has received. Then (1) 
becomes 
L luv - L Ivu = (1- 0:) L luv, (2) 
u :(u ,v)Ee u :(v,u )Ee u :(u ,v)Ee 
for each v E V \ {s, t}. 
We compare the performance of seed node selection al­
gorithms in terms of the final active size with 0: = 80%, 
0: = 50% and 0: = 20% for all ordinary nodes, respectively. 
For the cluster identification scheme, we set the cut-off thresh­
old w = 0.4. 
C. Result 
Here we study the effect of node cooperativeness level on 
the performance of seed node selection strategy. The result 
is shown in Figure 3. The results are obtained as averages of 
500 simulation runs. The x-axis represents the cooperativeness 
level 0: and the y-axis represents the final active set size. 
From the figure we can see that the performance of the 
seed node selection scheme improves as 0: increases, and 
the performance of algorithms with a larger target set size is 
always more satisfactory. An intuitive implication for online 
social advertising practitioners is that in order to achieve an 
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effective onIine viral marketing campaign, they should offer 
enough incentive to recruit enough initial product adopters to 
seed the infiuence cascade. They should also provide incentive 
to other nodes in the system so that all nodes in the network 
would be cooperative to propagate the infiuence. 
Figure 4 shows the performance comparison of cluster­
based heuristic with the weighted degree centrality metric and 
our proposed fiow-based centrality metric when 0: = 80%, 
0: = 50% and 0: = 20% (ordinary nodes are only 0:­
cooperative as described in Section V-B). The x-axis represents 
the number of initially active nodes and the y-axis represents 
the final active set size. We can see that if we compare the 
performance of the two metrics separately, the average active 
set size is bigger when 0: is higher. This further verifies aur 
30 
conc1usion in Figure 3 that if nodes in the system choose 
to reserve its resource (i.e. channel capacity), the infiuence 
propagation process cannot achieve a satisfactory performance. 
Thus it is important to provide incentives for nodes in the 
system to be cooperative. 
Figure 4 also strongly supports our proposition that the new 
fiow-based metric is more robust against node noncooperation 
in the system. From the figure we can see that not only the 
final active set size under the fiow-based metric outperforms 
the weighted degree metric with the same 0:, but also the final 
active size when nodes are 50% cooperative is comparable 
to the final active set size under the weighted degree metric 
when nodes are 80% cooperative. Moreover, the final active 
set size under the fiow-based metric when nodes are only 20% 
cooperative is even better than weighted degree metric when 
nodes in the system are 50% cooperative in most of the target 
set size. The key implication is that our proposed metric is 
probably the best choice to achieve satisfactory performance 
for marketing practitioners with restricted budget to encourage 
nodes to be cooperative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the infiuence maximization problem 
in noncooperative social networks. We generalize LTM to 
take node noncooperation into consideration and provide a 
provable approximation guarantees for the noncooperative in­
fiuence maximization problem. Then we propose an analytical 
model based on the generalized maximum fiow problem which 
captures a node's behavior in maximizing infiuence. Based 
on this, we develop a new seed node selection strategy for 
LTM which accounts for user noncooperativeness. Extensive 
simulations on large collaboration networks show that our 
proposed strategy outperforms the original scheme under var­
ious noncooperative scenarios, that is, the proposed metric is 
more robust when nodes are not cooperative. The evaluation 
also shows the importance of cooperation and incentive in 
maximizing infiuence. In this paper we assurne a two-tiered 
and static differentiation of nodes' cooperativeness in the 
system, i.e., seed nodes are cooperative to propagate the 
infiuence while the ordinary nodes are only partly willing to do 
so. In the future, we would like to study the impact of transient 
distribution of node cooperativeness (e.g., cooperativeness is 
related to incentives, social distance, and changes over time) 
on the performance of infiuence maximization algorithms. 
Another potential future direction is to study the impact of 
noncooperation in other infiuence diffusion models, inc1uding 
those which do not satisfy the submodularity requirement. 
Of course, generalizing the noncooperative LTM to ICM 
and finding a remedy to the inefficiency caused by node 
noncooperation in ICM are interesting research directions. 
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